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Traditional Knowledge and Global Lawmaking 
Kuei-Jung Ni! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The value and significance of traditional knowledge (TK)1 has been widely recognized. 
According to the study of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), TK has 
tremendous merits in various respects, generating cultural, social, ecological, biological, 
agricultural, and industrial values.2 
¶2 In short, TK refers to the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities in the world. Yet there seems to be no definite and universally approved definition 
of TK.3 The concept of TK may be reflected in the work of the WIPO, which outlines its general 
scope as follows: 
[T]he term “traditional knowledge” refers to the content or substance of 
knowledge resulting from intellectual activity in a traditional context, and 
includes the know-how, skills, innovations, practices and learning that form part 
                                                
! Professor of Law & Director, Institute of Technology Law, National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan. Ph.D. in Law 
(University of Edinburgh); LL.M. (University of California at Berkeley); LL.M. (National Taiwan Ocean 
University); LL.B. (National Taiwan University). A preliminary version of this article was presented at the 
“International Conference on Culture Diversity under International Trade Regimes: Policy and Practices,” organized 
by the Asian Center for WTO and International Health Law and Policy, College of Law, National Taiwan University 
in Taipei, Taiwan, on June 28-29, 2007. This research work was supported by a grant from the National Science 
Council of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (NSC 97-2410-H-009-025-MY3-). The author thanks Jo Ting Fu and 
Kai Chih Chang for their helpful assistance. 
1 The alternative term of ‘Indigenous Knowledge’ has also been used for the description of this knowledge. See 
CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT 
BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 20 (2006); Suman Sahai, Indigenous Knowledge and Its Protection in 
India, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 174 
(Christophe Bellmann et al. eds. 2003). 
2 Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and 
Principles, Eighth Sess., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, Geneva, June 6-
10, 2005, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/5 [hereinafter IGC Eighth Sess. Doc.]; IGC, The Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, Ninth Sess., Geneva, Apr. 24-28, 2006, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, Revised Provisions for 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Policy Objectives and Core Principles, Annexes to both 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/5 and WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, I. Policy Objectives, Annex 3 (2006) [hereinafter WIPO DRAFT, 
TK Objectives and Principles]. 
3 Peter Drahos, A Networked Responsive Regulatory Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A 
TRIPS-PLUS ERA 396 (Daniel J. Gervais ed. 2007). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 86 
of traditional knowledge systems, and knowledge embodying traditional lifestyles 
of indigenous and local communities, or contained in codified knowledge systems 
passed between generations.4  
¶3 From an ownership perspective, TK could arguably be classified as a form of intellectual 
property. In contrast to the normal entitlements of intellectual property that individuals normally 
enjoy, however, the property elements of TK are quite unique. TK is generated collectively, and 
processed and preserved by indigenous peoples or local communities.5 TK is thus distinctively 
associated with a group of people who may regard their body of TK as being beyond that of a 
personal or proprietary nature. 
¶4 TK is often transmitted orally from generation to generation,6 and it typically is not 
codified within any modern system of documentation. TK is also not limited to any precise form, 
“tak[ing] the form of stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, 
community laws, local language, and agricultural practices, including the development of plant 
species and animal breeds.”7 The uniquely communal sense in which TK is possessed might 
estrange it from modern intellectual property rights.8  
¶5 Due to TK’s conservation value, its preservation can make a great contribution to 
sustainable development of biodiversity.9  Thus, such a robust body of law governing TK may 
involve complex considerations of environmental, developmental and social elements.        
¶6 Further, given the close linkages between TK and its holders, TK holders become the most 
indispensable stakeholder in designing any legal structure concerning TK.10 Certainly, the 
                                                
4 WIPO DRAFT, TK Objectives and Principles, supra note 2, art. 3(2). Drahos considers the WIPO’s ‘open-ended, 
inclusive approach to the subject matter of TK’ an adequate model.  Drahos, supra note 3.   
5 See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/traditional/intro.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011). 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 One study shows that modern intellectual property rights systems, such as patents, copyright, trade secrets, and 
trademarks seem not really available to TK holders, in spite of few national practices using intellectual property 
rights for TK protection. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES AND 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 100-09 (2004); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS 
STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 225 (2007) (arguing that intellectual property rights are 
inadequate for the protection of indigenous bio-diversity rights). Cf. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s 
Hut to the Patent Office: A Road Under Construction, in BIODIVERSITY & THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 257-58 (Charles R. McManis ed. 2007) (indicating national 
protection of TK by using existing IP systems); David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to 
Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 253 (2000) (speculating the feasibility of articulating 
intellectual property rights over TK).    
9 It is observed that TK “commonly refers to knowledge associated with the environment” DUTFIELD, supra note 8, 
at 91. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) recognizes that many indigenous and local communities that 
are TK holders “have cultivated and used biological diversity in a sustainable way for thousands of years. Some of 
their practices have been proven to enhance and promote biodiversity at the local level and aid in maintaining 
healthy ecosystems.” Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5. 
10 The instruments of WIPO and the U.N. on TK have addressed the needs of TK holders. See infra Part III. B. D. 
Vol. 10:2] Kuei-Jung Ni 
 87 
promotion and recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples will be instrumental in pressuring 
national authorities to take necessary measures to protect TK, especially when such actions entail 
the conclusion of binding treaties.11 
¶7 As TK is created, applied, and preserved by local and indigenous communities, its 
protection used to be a national or local matter and concern. Nonetheless, there are significant 
reasons for the international community to pay due regard to TK protection as well, and there is a 
growing global movement to promote the international status of indigenous peoples, who possess 
most TK. For one, given its intrinsic value, the protection and preservation of TK benefits 
humankind as a whole, and should accordingly be of interest to the international community. In 
particular, because TK access and utilization has been exercised in boundary-crossing ways, the 
theft of TK has been and should continue to be strongly intolerant to international society. 
Misappropriation of TK has led to the granting of undesirable patents on inventions based 
directly on TK related to local bio-diversity, resulting in a form of TK piracy.12  
¶8 To date, the international community has responded to the issue of TK by formulating a 
variety of documents with differential legal implications. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD)13 appears to be the first international agreement that obliges State parties to 
protect bio-related TK. The CBD has mandated the use of TK to comply with access and benefit-
sharing devices.  After intense debate and study, the WIPO, based on a defensive approach, has 
drafted an unprecedented instrument exclusively for the protection of TK. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has been negotiating the relationship between its intellectual property 
agreement, namely the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS),14 and the CBD, in which a proposal to revise patent disclosure so as to add certain CBD 
mandates has aroused heated debate.15 Following decades of effort, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations has finally adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples16 in which 
                                                
11 Drahos, supra note 3, at 393-94. 
12 TK has been misappropriated occasionally without just cause, either through failure to gain the approval of the 
holders of such knowledge, or failure to share any benefits with the holders. A number of infamous bio-piracy cases 
not only refer to misappropriation of national genetic resources but also associated TK. For an illustration of piracy 
on TK, see generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 65-67 
(2000) (outlining patents on turmeric, neem and quinoa that were erroneously granted). 
13 The Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force 
Dec. 1993) [hereinafter CBD]. 
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: 
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
15 See generally Kuei-Jung Ni, The Incorporation of the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing into TRIPS 
Regime: An Appraisal on the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich Genetic Resources, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & 
INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 433, 446-54 (2006) (summarizing and analyzing the conflicting views and rational among 
WTO members regarding the disclosure proposal). 
16 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 
2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. The U.N. Declaration was adopted by a majority of 143 states in favor, with 4 
votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 88 
the rights of peoples regarding TK has been squarely recognized. The CBD, WIPO, and the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, all sub organs of the U.N., as well as the WTO, 
have become the major contributors towards global TK lawmaking.17 
¶9 This article aims to explore how these key global legal systems engage in the protection of 
TK by formulating rules of either hard law or soft law. The study will preliminarily analyze the 
legal implications and effect of those instruments. Part II examines the relevance of global 
lawmaking to TK. Part III reviews the present global legal frameworks dealing with the 
protection of TK. Then, Part IV assesses the feasibility of establishing a coherent and integrated 
instrument for TK protection when individual international legal devices are presumed to be of 
only limited function. Part V presents the conclusion.          
II. THE RELEVANCE OF GLOBAL LAWMAKING TO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: WHY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS 
¶10 As indicated above, TK is developed by local indigenous communities. Management of TK 
was long a local matter. Yet, in recent years, the protection of TK has become a growing concern 
in the international community. The achievement of the international endeavor to protect such 
intellectual and cultural heritage may contribute to the welfare of human kind as a whole. 
¶11 Apart from local peoples, TK has also been acquired and employed by foreign entities, 
including foreign individuals, research academics, and multinational companies. The 
transnational nature of modern TK use underscores the need to create legal frameworks to 
regulate such transnational activities not only through national authorities but also through 
international mechanisms as well.18 In addition, there has been an international movement to 
promote and recognize the rights of indigenous peoples who hold most TK. TK protection can be 
viewed as an imminent international matter, especially from the perspective of international 
human rights.19      
¶12 International lawmaking could be conducive to TK protection, if employed effectively. 
With respect to crafting substantial international rules, relevant international institutions may 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine). See Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).  But, those four 
objecting nations recently have shifted their position to support the declaration. See U.N. Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues website: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/news.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
17 These forums have often been noted by legal scholarship. See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, 
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338-45 (2008); Carvalho, supra note 8; Drahos, supra note 3, at 385-86. 
Nonetheless, apart from the above-mentioned regimes, there are other U.N. forums that also pay regard to the TK 
issue, such as the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5. 
18 As an aside, note that Professor Jessup’s notion of transnational law can be fairly applied to TK regulation. PHILIP 
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). 
19 See infra Part III.D. 
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engage in the negotiations regarding common conditions and standard-setting among States with 
a view to providing either a minimal or basic level of protection or a strict universally applied 
requirement. In pursuing the latter option, imposing clear obligations upon contracting parties 
generates a legally binding force that makes the non-compliance of parties a serious matter.20 
However, States are usually inclined to resist entering into binding agreements that might 
deprive them of their discretion over protected matters. Accordingly, States may reach 
compromise by opting instead for a minimum level of protection in the form of relatively weak 
guidelines or recommendations.21 In spite of the soft law character of these non-binding 
agreements, empirical studies have underlined their essential role in the international legal 
system.22    
¶13 In order to strengthen protection measures, international institutions have a wide range of 
options available to them. First, international institutions can formulate enforcement mechanisms 
to ensure national implementation of treaty obligations and to enforce compliance through rules 
governing procedure and remedy. For example, the U.N. Security Council is empowered with 
very strong enforcement authority by which coercive or non-coercive measures may be taken to 
redress violations.23 The compliance system operative in the Montreal Protocol, which regulates 
compliance with environmental regulations, also represents an effective model.24  
¶14 Second, if no binding agreement or solid enforcement mechanism has yet been established, 
international institutions may avail themselves of non-legally binding resolutions or 
recommendations to persuade violators to correct their impermissible behavior.25 Ideally, a 
                                                
20 PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERIN REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 245-46 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
21 See Bonn Guidelines infra Part III. A.3.a.  
22 For a thorough study on the role of non-binding norms, including an environmental perspective, See generally 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
(Dinah Shelton et al. eds. 2000). Soft law instruments can constitute a dynamic part of the multilateral treaty-making 
process. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-20 (2007).   
23 U.N. Charter arts. 41, 42. 
24 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 16, 1987 [hereinafter Montreal 
Protocol]. In Annex IV of the Montreal Protocol, entitled “Non-compliance Procedure,” an Implementation 
Committee was established in order to supervise the national implementation of the Protocol.  According to 
paragraph 9 of the Annex, the Committee shall report to the Meeting of Parties (MOP) of the Protocol, including any 
recommendations it considers appropriate. Then, based upon the report, the Parties may decide upon and call for 
necessary measures to enforce full compliance with the Protocol. In order to avoid controversy and to confine the 
extent and content of the measures the Parties may take, Annex V of the Protocol sets up a list of available measures 
in a straightforward manner. Apart from non-coercive and incentive means, in paragraph C of the Annex, suspension 
of trade is clearly specified. See also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 246-48, 353-54. 
25 For instance, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) has 
not yet built an enforceable compliance mechanism as effective as that of the Montreal Protocol. However, in 
response to the trade on endangered rhinos and tigers during the mid-1990’s, CITES called upon contracting parties 
to use trade restriction measures against countries that failed to obey its resolutions. Following the non-binding 
resolutions, the U.S. soon invoked the Pelly Amendment to impose trade sanctions on Taiwan. For a description of 
the episode, see Christine Crawford, Note, Conflicts Between the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species and the GATT in Light of Actions to Halt the Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
555, 560-70 (1995). 
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dispute settlement mechanism should be established to provide remedies for the breach of 
obligations. The dispute settlement body of the WTO has been generally considered effective 
and useful because it adopts compulsory jurisdiction and authorizes sanctions to make effective 
its adjudications.26    
¶15 Apart from the lawmaking process, international institutions often also engage in national 
capacity building by providing technical and financial support and assisting in national 
implementation of standards. Of course, international cooperation should be mandated or 
encouraged, such as informational and technical exchanges and technology transfers.27  
¶16 As mentioned, the use of TK frequently involves transnational actions of foreign entities. It 
is difficult to deny the limits and probable deficiencies of international regulations on TK; 
“international law based upon the regulation of state behavior is ill-equipped to respond to 
corporate behavior, or that of other non-state actors.”28 It is uncertain to what extent the making 
of TK-related international law may progress, and the effectiveness of these tools also remains to 
be seen.29 Yet certainly the ongoing lawmaking process may provide an impetus for the 
protection, preservation, and development of TK at the international level. 
¶17 The following text will examine the present and ongoing lawmaking activities for TK 
initiated by a variety of international institutions.  
III. HOW DO THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO THE PROTECTION OF 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE?30 
A. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
1. The Convention on Biological Diversity Context 
¶18 Adopted in 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is one of the most 
prominent multilateral environmental agreements dealing with the conservation and sustainable 
use of the earth’s biodiversity.31 TK, in a general sense, has played a significant role in 
                                                
26 See infra Part III.C and accompanying text. Cf. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 250 (noting unsatisfactory 
resolution of disputes by the WTO mechanism). 
27 See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1037-43 (2d ed. 2003). 
28 BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 21. 
29 Experts have cautioned that treaties on TK may turn out to be ‘dead letters’ if they fail to coordinate the 
enforcement of existing norms. See Drahos, supra note 3, at 386-87. 
30 The current status of international legal instruments on the protection of traditional knowledge is elaborated in 
Annex I, infra.  
31 Apart from the CBD, there are other multilateral environmental agreements relevant to the conservation of 
wildlife, such as the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention); the 1972 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention); the 1973 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); and the 1979 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention). BIRNIE ET AL., supra 
note 20, at 652. 
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contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of this biodiversity.32 In its preamble, the 
CBD recognizes indigenous and local peoples’ close and traditional dependence on biological 
resources. In its text, the CBD places the preservation of bio-related TK as one of the contracting 
parties’ obligations under the “In-situ Conservation” of Article 8. Article 8(j) provides that every 
State Party shall: 
Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement 
of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices.33 
¶19 Thus, State Parties’ obligations under Article 8(j) include three aspects. First, each Party is 
required to preserve TK in its territories. Second, the CBD respects the rights of TK holders to 
the extent that the utilization of TK is not allowed without the approval of TK holders. Third, 
any contracting Party to the CBD is expected to formulate a system to ensure that TK holders 
enjoy the benefits that flow from the utilization of their TK. The first element is derived from a 
conservation perspective. The latter two mandates are designated to oblige Parties to establish 
suitable legal regimes upon which the application and benefit-sharing of TK can be fairly 
managed. 
¶20 Irrespective of CBD’s resolve to protect TK and its holders, the normative binding force on 
Parties seems tenuous. The mandate on States under Article 8(j) is “subject to its national 
legislation,” which may result in multiple interpretations and outcomes. One commentator seems 
not to worry about the problem of this expression, arguing that the usage “was included in order 
to protect the existing relationships between some States and their indigenous populations, and 
should not be interpreted as affording each Contracting Party discretion as whether or not to 
implement the provision.”34 Others argue, however, that obligations under Article 8(j) are 
eviscerated by inserting this phrase; arguably, national law, to some extent, may prevail over the 
CBD mandate.35 Moreover, opening passage of Article 8 qualifies this “mandate” by including 
the phrase “as far as possible and as appropriate.” 
                                                
32 See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5. 
33 CBD, supra note 13, art. 8(j). 
34 Michael I. Jeffery, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing under the Convention on 
Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747, 782 (2002). 
35 Aguilar considers the commitment of Art. 8(j) weak, contending that “without national legislation to implement 
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¶21 In addition to Article 8(j), the CBD includes other provisions related to the protection of 
TK. Article 10(c), which deals with sustainable use of TK on biodiversity, requires States to 
“protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional 
cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements.”36 
According to the CBD section concerning ‘Exchange of Information,’ indigenous and traditional 
knowledge is explicitly placed in the category of information to be exchanged.37 On the 
deployment of techniques to facilitate the fulfillment of the CBD objectives, such as ‘Technical 
and Scientific Cooperation,’ Article 18 requires parties to engage in cooperation for the 
development of technologies, which includes the aspect of TK.38 Lastly, it is evident that certain 
TK has been misappropriated, and then exploited to obtain intellectual property rights. Thus, TK 
issues should be covered by the CBD’s work to reconcile the protection of intellectual property 
rights with CBD’s objectives.39  
2. The Conference of the Parties and the Working Group on Article 8(j) 
¶22 Regardless of CBD provisions that set out lofty goals to protect TK and to promote the 
interests of TK holders, the treaty’s effectiveness hinges largely on the willingness and ability of 
States to perform their duties. The Conference of the Parties (COP), as the supreme decision-
making body of the CBD, is competent to monitor the implementation of the Convention.40 In 
addition, the COP also plays a significant role in assisting Contracting Parties to carry out their 
obligations. To fulfill the mandate, the COP shall “[e]stablish such subsidiary bodies, 
particularly to provide scientific and technical advice, as are deemed necessary for the 
implementation of this Convention.”41 At its fourth annual meeting, the COP, in decision IV/9, 
established an Ad Hoc Open-ended Inter-sessional Working Group to address the 
implementation of Article 8(j) and related provisions.42  
                                                                                                                                                       
the article, this is merely an expression of goodwill.” Grethel Aguilar, Access to Genetic Resources and Protection 
of Traditional Knowledge in Indigenous Territories, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON 
TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 176 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds. 2003). 
36 CBD, supra note 13, art. 10(c). 
37 Id. art. 17(2).  
38 Id. art. 18(4). It is argued that the inclusion of TK into the broader range of “technologies” in the CBD means that 
“there is no justification for assuming (as many tend to do) that such technologies have a lower status than other 
technologies relevant to the Convention; nor should they be any less morally entitled to legal protection.” GRAHAM 
DUFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 35 (2000). 
39 Article 16(5) of the CBD provides, “The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual 
property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this regard 
subject to national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not 
run counter to its objectives.” CBD, supra note 13, art. 16(5). 
40 CBD, supra note 13, art. 23(4). 
41 Id. art. 23(4)(g). 
42 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Fourth Meeting, Bratislava, Slovakia, May 4-15, 1998, COP Decision IV/9, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/4/20, Annex 1 (1998), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-04-dec-en.pdf 
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¶23 The primary mission of this working group is to provide the COP with advice relating to 
the implementation of such provisions.43 Based on the structure of the elements proposed in the 
Madrid workshop report,44 the Working Group formulated a programme of work on Article 8(j), 
which was subsequently adopted at the COP-5 in May 2000.45  
¶24 The programme of work aims to help Parties fulfill their commitments under Article 8(j) by 
highlighting a number of elements under which further specific tasks are listed. The programme 
constitutes a blueprint for the implementation of TK protection within the CBD context. First of 
all, considering the indispensable role of indigenous peoples and local communities in TK 
protection, the work programme places the full and effective participation of those groups at all 
stages and levels of its implementation as its key objective.46  
¶25 Secondly, the programme initiated the study and survey of status and trends of TK in 
question. Shortly thereafter, in 2002, an outline of a composite report was endorsed at the COP-
6.47 In the report, the Working Group was requested to explore the possibility of developing 
technical guidelines for recording and documenting TK, and to analyze the potential threats 
posed by documentation to the rights of TK holders.48  Further, in order to facilitate and assist 
Parties and governments in the fulfillment of their commitments under Article 8(j) and related 
provisions, the Working Group has been assigned to engage in the elaboration of several sets of 
guidelines.49 
                                                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter COP decision IV/9]. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya, May 15-26, 2000, Programme of Work on the 
Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Annex to COP 
Decision V/16, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, Annex III, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-
05/full/cop-05-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Programme of Work ]. 
46 Id. at 143. The COP has continuously encouraged Parties to include TK holders in their delegations for the 
Working Group to promote consultations among the groups on issues covered by the Working Group. See COP 
decision IV/9, supra note 42, ¶¶ 3, 4, 12; Programme of Work, supra note 45, ¶¶ 5, 18. Recently, the COP at its 
ninth meeting paid more attention on the “participatory mechanisms for indigenous and local communities in the 
Convention.” The Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn, 
Ger., May 19-30, 2008, COP Decision IX/13E, at 67-68, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf. 
47 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting, The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7-19, 2002, Outline of a Composite Report on the 
Status and Trends regarding Knowledge, Innovations and Practices of Indigenous and Local Communities relevant 
for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, and the Plan and Timetable for its Preparation, 
Annex I to COP Decision VI/10, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-
06/full/cop-06-dec-en.pdf. 
48 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Eighth Meeting, Curitiba, Braz., Mar. 20-31, 2006, COP Decision VIII/5BI, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-08- dec-en.pdf.   
49 See Programme of Work, supra note 45, at 145-46, Element 3, Task 6, 13, 14, 15 at 145-46 (including the respect, 
preservation, and maintenance of TK; efforts to strengthen the use of TK; the establishment of national incentive 
schemes for indigenous peoples to preserve and maintain their TK and for the application of such TK; and the 
facilitation of repatriation of TK information). 
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¶26 Thirdly, with respect to regulations to ensure fair TK access, one of the focal points of the 
programme has been the development of guidelines to ensure the utilization of TK with the 
consent of the holders and to ensure they can obtain an equitable share of benefits arising from 
the utilization.50 To effectively protect such interests, the Article 8(j) Working Group’s 
programme emphasizes prevention measures regarding the misappropriation of TK.51 
¶27 In practice, many States have adopted specific laws to implement the programme of work 
on Article 8(j). For instance, Peruvian law requires that people who are interested in having 
access to the knowledge must apply for the prior informed consent of TK holders.52 In an effort 
to document TK, Peruvian law also initiates systems of registration of TK.53 
¶28 The more recent and prominent progress and achievement of the CBD lawmaking on 
Article 8(j) are found in the drafting of a text on “elements of a code of ethical conduct,” which 
were finally adopted at COP-10 in 2010.54 The elements of the code are designed to provide 
guidance to assist Parties in building their national legal frameworks to fulfill their commitments 
on respect, preservation, and maintenance of TK.55  
¶29 The context of the code elaborates and expands the original TK protection mandate 
enunciated in Article 8(j). The document manages to cover any activities and interactions with 
indigenous and local communities that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity.56 Further, regarding the place where the activities are operative, and 
considering the integral connection between TK and the environment where they traditionally 
exist, the code specifies that the geographic coverage of protection may extend to sacred sites, 
culturally significant sites, and lands and waters in which such activities may occur.57 
                                                
50 Id. at 144, Element 4, Task 7. 
51 Id. at 146, Element 6, Task 10. 
52 Ley N° 27811, art. 6 del 24 de julio de 2002, mediante la cual se establece el régimen de protección de los 
conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indígenas vinculados a los recursos biológicos (Peru) [Law N° 27811, art. 
6. of July 24, 2002] [Law Establishing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples 
Derived from Biological Resources], available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3420 [hereinafter 
Peruvian Law N° 27811]. 
53 Id. arts. 15-24. 
54 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Tenth Meeting, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18-29, 2010, The Tkarihwaieri Code of Ethical 
Conduct on Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant to the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, Annex to COP Decision X/42, at 3, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/42 (Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-42-
en.pdf [hereinafter Code of Ethical Conduct].  For a previous draft of the code, see Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Ninth 
Meeting, Bonn, Ger., May 19-30, 2008, Draft Elements of A Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the 
Cultural and Intellectual Heritage Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant to the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, Annex to COP Decision IX/13G, at 70, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 
(June 30, 2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf. 
55 Code of Ethical Conduct, supra note 54, ¶ 3. 
56 See id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. ¶¶ 3, 17.   
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¶30 The major part of the code underlines several ethical principles applicable to the activities 
and interactions in questions. Some of them tend to confirm the privileges of indigenous peoples, 
although the passage carefully avoids using terms that indicate group rights. The privileges 
consist of claims on intellectual property relevant to TK, the right to know (keeping the operation 
of the activities transparency), the right to give prior informed consent, and the right to claim 
benefit-sharing.58 As the term ‘rights’ has yet to be clearly specified in Article 8(j),59 other 
principles underline the burdens imposed on entities engaging in relevant activities, without 
producing concrete commitments regarding TK protection.60   
¶31 More importantly, apart from delivering general ethical principles, the code also provides 
‘specific consideration,’ which arguably incorporates human rights aspects under the rubric of 
TK protection. The approach clearly indicates the attempt to link TK protection to certain 
indigenous peoples’ human rights which have already been promoted by other instruments of 
international human rights,61 such as recognition of rights to lands and waters occupied or used 
by indigenous peoples, rights to traditional resources, and the right not to be removed.62  
¶32 Indeed, the code emphasizes that it “should not be construed as altering or interpreting the 
obligations of Parties to the Convention . . .”63 Such inclusion appears to be an indication of 
minimizing the legal effect of the document. Nevertheless, when viewing the document as a 
whole, its elaboration and amplification of the original mandate of TK protection specified in the 
wording of Article 8(j) is simply in line with the usual model developed in the lawmaking 
process of multilateral treaties.64  
3. Protection of Genetic Resources and the Access and Benefit-Sharing Regime 
i)  The Bonn Guidelines’ Device on TK 
¶33 One of the objectives of the CBD aims to ensure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising out of the utilization of biodiversity resources,65 especially genetic resources.66 The goal 
reflects grave concerns over the protection of genetic resource-providing countries from the 
                                                
58 Id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 11, 14. In paragraph 11, the terms “prior informed consent (PIC)” and/or “Approval and 
Involvement” of TK holders are placed together.   
59 See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 627. 
60 E.g., Code of Ethical Conduct, supra note 54, ¶¶ 7, 12, 15. 
61 Id. ¶ 17. For instance, ILO 169’s standard and the recent U.N. Declaration touch on the land rights of indigenous 
peoples and carry similar implications to that of the CBD Code. 
62 Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 19. 
63 Id. ¶ 1.  
64 It is not uncommon that a soft law form of an instrument delivered after a previously concluded treaty may 
constitute a tool of interpretation for provisions of treaties. See generally BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 216-
17.  
65 CBD, supra note 13, art. 1. 
66 CBD defines genetic resources as genetic material of actual or potential value. Id. art. 2. 
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unauthorized, uncompensated activities of bioprospectors, particularly bio-piracy.67 Article 15 of 
the CBD provides the basic elements upon which State Parties may establish their access regimes 
for genetic resources. This provision first confers upon States sovereign rights over the 
resources, so that States have the authority to regulate access to their genetic resources.68 More 
importantly, the law requires that any Party wanting such access must obtain Prior and Informed 
Consent from Parties and also mandates the sharing of benefits arising from authorized genetic 
resource bioprospecting, which is based upon mutually agreed upon terms.69 
¶34 Since the inception of the CBD regime, contracting parties have attempted to build the 
Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) regime. Meanwhile, many of them require capacity building 
and technical support for the construction of their related legal and administrative frameworks. 
The CBD thus established an Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit 
Sharing (ABS) in an attempt to facilitate parties’ implementation of Article 15 and related 
provisions.70 In 2002, at its sixth meeting, the COP, in decision VI/24, adopted the work prepared 
by the Working Group in this regard, namely the “Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.”71 
¶35 Apart from genetic resources, the Guidelines extend the ABS elements to cover associated 
traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices.72 Thus, access to national genetic resource-
related TK and its benefit-sharing could be guided by the Bonn instrument.73 Of course, the Bonn 
Guidelines specify a number of guiding principles for TK in each sector.  
¶36 For instance, competent national authorities are expected to provide advice on a 
“mechanism for the effective participation of indigenous and local communities.”74 The users of 
TK should “respect customs, traditions, values, and customary practices of indigenous and local 
communities.”75 State Parties, who discover that genetic resource users are under their 
                                                
67 For a description of bio-piracy on bio-resources, see DUTFIELD, supra note 8, at 52-59; Jeffery, supra note 34, at 
757, n.53. For the genetic recourses-providing countries’ attempt to revoke undesirable patents obtained by bio-
piracy, see also Ni, supra note 15, at 437-38. 
68 CBD, supra note 13, art. 15(1). 
69 Id. art. 15(5)(7). 
70 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya, May 15-26, 2000, Annex III to COP Decision V/26A, at 
197, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-05-dec-en.pdf 
[hereinafter CBD COP-V decision].  
71 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting, The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7-19, 2002, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, Annex to COP Decision 
VI/24A, at 263, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-06-dec-
en.pdf [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines]. 
72 Id. ¶ 9.      
73 Given the relevance of the Bonn Guidelines to the work of the Working Group on Article 8(j), the COP requests 
the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions to consider the Guidelines as 
relevant to its ongoing work. See Bonn Guidelines, supra note 71, at 263. 
74 Bonn Guidelines, supra note 71, ¶ 14(g). 
75 Id. ¶ 16(b)(ii). 
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jurisdiction, “could” consider adopting measures to encourage the disclosure of the origin of TK 
while applying for intellectual property rights.76 In accessing biodiversity-related TK, the prior 
informed consent of TK holders should be obtained in accordance with their traditional practices, 
national access policies, and subject to domestic laws.77 With regards to the mutually agreed 
upon terms between users and providers, the Guidelines provide an indicative list of typical 
terms, including “whether relevant TK has been respected, preserved and maintained, and 
whether the customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices has 
been protected and encouraged.”78 
¶37 The practice of some developing countries hosting TK has been consistent with the Bonn 
Guidelines. In Brazil, applicants for intellectual property rights must disclose the origin of the 
genetic material and the associated traditional knowledge.79 This is distinct from the Peruvian 
practice regarding the requirement of prior informed consent mentioned above. 
¶38 Although the informative and detailed Guidelines have contributed greatly to the field, the 
instrument remains a voluntary commitment, rather than a binding obligation.80 In effect, the 
Guidelines give Parties much discretion in managing access to genetic resource-associated TK 
without undertaking real international obligations.  
ii) The Nagoya Protocol’s Device on TK 
¶39 Responding to the call of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development,81 the CBD 
has been engaging in the elaboration and negotiation of an international regime with a view to 
strengthening the enforcement of ABS requirements under the CBD.82 A preliminary draft on the 
regime was formulated and revealed at the eighth meeting of the COP in 2006.83 According to 
the draft, the scope of the international regime is in line with the Bonn Guidelines and applies 
                                                
76 Id. ¶ 16(d)(ii). 
77 Id. ¶ 31. 
78 Id. ¶ 44(g). 
79 Provisional Measure No. 2.186-16, art. 31, Braz., Aug. 23, 2001, available at 
http://www.grain.org/brl/?docid=850&lawid=1768. 
80 Bonn Guidelines, supra note 71, ¶ 7. 
81 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, ¶ 42(o), adopted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, at 139 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf.   
82 See CBD website, International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing, http://www.cbd.int/ abs/regime.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011).  For a general overview of the CBD’s lawmaking progress on international regimes see 
Kuei-Jung Ni, Legal Aspects of Prior Informed Consent on Access to Genetic Resources: An Analysis of Global and 
Local Implementation towards an Optimal Normative Construction, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 227, 242-50 
(2009).  
83 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Eighth Meeting, Curitiba, Brazil, Mar. 20-31, 2006, International Regime on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing, Annex to COP Decision VIII/4A, at 53, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (June 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-08- dec-en.pdf. 
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both to genetic resources and associated TK. The draft clearly seeks to enforce the interests of 
TK holders. 
¶40 In effect, the 2006 draft proposes to contain measures to ensure compliance with the prior 
informed consent of TK holders.84 The inclusion of measures to prevent misappropriation and 
unauthorized access and use of TK is also under deliberation.85 The draft further requires that 
Parties take enforcement measures, such as sanctions, to prevent uses of TK that fail to comply 
with provisions of the international regime.86   
¶41 At its ninth meeting in 2008, the COP adopted a more detailed agenda on the negotiations 
of the international regime.87 Regarding the protection of TK in the context of the ABS system, 
the agenda provides components to be negotiated, which fulfill and elaborate the mandate of 
ABS disclosed in Article 8(j). However, it should be noted that Article 8(j) actually does not use 
identical terms as those in Article 15 of the CBD.88 To expand and apply the ABS regime 
originating in Article 15 to cover TK protection requires further study and political will. In order 
to assist the ABS Working Group, the COP decided to establish a group of technical and legal 
experts on genetic resource-related TK to study and examine relevant issues, such as the 
definition of associated TK, the applicability of ABS in Article 15 to TK and the legal basis of 
prior informed consent for TK holders.89 
¶42 The result of the seventh meeting of the Working Group on ABS reveals more specific 
elements on TK’s ABS device,90 which elaborates and amplifies Article 8(j) and the Bonn 
Guidelines in this regard. It manages to define clearly the rights and obligations of both TK 
holders and national authorities. The draft tends to promote the status of indigenous and local 
communities with regard to TK access by confirming their right to be consulted by authorities, 
including on the matters of prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms in benefit-sharing, and 
effective participation.91 To allow them to actively and meaningfully engage, Parties hosting TK 
                                                
84 Id. at 134.  
85 Id. at 135. 
86 Id. 
87 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Ninth Meeting, Bonn, Ger., May 19-30, 2008, International Regime, Annex I to COP 
Decision IX/12, at 53, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Biological Diversity Ninth Mtg].  
88 For instance, the CBD prior informed consent requirement of Art. 15 is not specified in Art. 8(j). 
89 Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn, Ger., May 19-30, 2008, Terms of Reference of the Expert Groups 
Established in Paragraph 11 of Decision IX/12, Annex IIC to COP Decision IX/12, at 61, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf.  
90 Convention on Biological Diversity, Paris, Fr., Apr. 2-8, 2009, Report of the Seventh Mtg. of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8, Annex, at 21 (May 5, 
2009), http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-07/official/abswg-07-08-en.pdf. 
91 Id. at 31-32. 
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are required to provide capacity building, to ensure appropriate participation, and to provide 
assistance in giving prior informed consent and forming mutually agreed terms.92  
¶43 At the eighth meeting of the Working Group on ABS, under the insistence and advocacy of 
genetic resource-rich countries, an agenda to negotiate a binding protocol for the international 
regime prevailed.93 Meanwhile, more draft texts to uphold the rights of TK holders in ABS 
continued to be produced.94  
¶44 At the last ABS working group meeting prior to the COP-10, a revised draft protocol on 
ABS was then formulated in the form of a treaty.95 The draft largely reflects the genuine 
expectations of indigenous and local communities by requiring TK hosting Parties to grant TK 
holders the right to prior informed consent and benefit-sharing while genetic resource-related TK 
is accessed and utilized.96 Parties’ obligation to support capacity building for TK holders has also 
been confirmed.97 However, some phrases are still subject to deliberation and final approval. 
Moreover, Parties’ obligations, such as those concerning TK access, are to some extent also 
weakened by the addition of compromising language, such as “with the aim of” and “as 
appropriate.”98  
¶45 At its tenth meeting, held in Japan in October 2011, the COP eventually adopted the 
Nagoya Protocol on ABS99 to finalize the six years of negotiation for creating an international 
ABS regime. Most elements concerning TK that were negotiated in the previous drafts have been 
reflected in the Protocol. As such, the treaty seems to oblige both TK hosting and user countries 
to ensure that TK holders’ rights to benefit-sharing and prior informed consent are enforced. 
However, the obligatory level of certain items remains deferential. For instance, each Party’s 
obligation to fulfill TK holders’ entitlement to share benefits is abated by inserting “as 
appropriate.”100 Furthermore, with respect to TK access, indigenous groups’ exercise of prior 
informed consent rights must be in accordance with domestic law.101 In other words, Parties’ 
                                                
92 Id. at 32-33. 
93 Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, Can., Nov. 9-15, 2009, Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, ¶¶ 32, 49, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/8 (Nov. 
20, 2009), http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-08/official/abswg-08-08-en.pdf. 
94 Id. Annex I. 
95 Convention on Biological Diversity, Cali, Colom, Mar. 22-28, 2010, The Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/CRP.1, Annex I (Mar. 
25, 2009). 
96 Id. art. 4, ¶ 4; art. 5. 
97 Id. art. 9, ¶ 3 (Parties are required to support the development of community protocols, minimum requirements 
and model contractual clauses on ABS); art. 18, ¶ 3. 
98 Id. art. 4, ¶ 4; art. 5. 
99 Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18-29, 2010, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, COP Decision X/1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1, Annex I, at 5 (Oct. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-10-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol]. 
100 Id. art. 5(5). 
101 Id. art. 7. 
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obligation to enforce prior informed consent rights of TK holders hinges on whether domestic 
law affirms such a right. Without such domestic law, no Party would be held responsible for 
treaty violation. Such an arrangement indicates the unwillingness of Parties, at the current stage, 
to allow the new treaty to change their national level of protection for TK holders.  
¶46 The Nagoya Protocol will remain open for signature by Parties to the Convention from 
February 2, 2011 until February 1, 2012, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. 
Because the Protocol is still in the signature stage, it remains to be seen how many countries 
ultimately ratify the protocol and what effect it will have on international TK protection. What is 
clear is that, without changes in domestic law, the Protocol has not yet established a strong 
mandate to require Parties to observe ABS elements for TK holders below the international level. 
4. Reflection and Comments on the CBD’s Progress 
¶47 Presently, it may be safe to say that the CBD is the most dynamic international legal system 
for promoting the protection of TK, although its mandate is confined to the context of 
biodiversity-related areas. In effect, the regime constitutes one of the most significant 
international institutions that pay due regard to TK holders. While no precise and definite 
obligations of Parties are specified in Article 8(j) of the CBD in terms of TK preservation, it 
remains to be seen how nations may seriously implement Article 8(j) in its broader sense. 
Nonetheless, while recognizing the indispensable role of TK holders in the fulfillment of the 
mandate of Article 8(j), the CBD’s continuous efforts to make indigenous peoples and local 
communities involved in relevant lawmaking and deliberation processes cannot be 
underestimated.102 
¶48 The CBD has finished a preliminary study and survey on the status of TK and proposed 
certain means for its preservation, such as documentation of TK. Currently, at least one soft law 
character of guidance in assisting implementation has been formulated and adopted.103  
¶49 Indeed, the current work of guidelines and principles is not of a binding nature, but is 
instead voluntary. Nonetheless, as observed, some international soft law instruments do go 
beyond the status of a simply non-binding force and may be transformed into binding form while 
having dynamic interaction with related treaty regimes.104 It would thus be premature to predict 
how far the Working Group’s efforts on Article 8(j) may go in terms of influencing national TK 
                                                
102 It is submitted that the CBD “will provide the forum within which such communities can participate and thus 
influence the parties when developing policies, guidelines or protocols impinging upon their interests…” BIRNIE ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 628. 
103 Code of Ethical Conduct, supra note 54. 
104 For an explanation on how soft law instruments interact with treaty regimes and how the law goes beyond non-
binding force, see generally BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 216. 
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policy.  However, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, some developing countries have 
already begun implementing such instruments.   
¶50 The attempt to formulate a code of ethical conduct is an indication of the CBD’s broader 
perspective on TK protection, which is not limited to the knowledge itself, but manages to 
extend to the geographic and ecological environment where TK originates and develops. The 
move should be justifiable and desirable given the close and inalienable linkage between them. 
In particular, the incorporation of a human rights approach for TK protection could further the 
legal status of TK holders and safeguard TK from undesirable activities. Thus, in contrast to 
some observations,105 the progress of TK working groups has actually moved towards the 
clarification of the rights of TK holders, in spite of its voluntary nature.        
¶51 Apart from calling for the submission of national reports regarding Parties’ 
implementation, the CBD on Article 8(j) makes little progress with respect to monitoring 
mechanisms. Given the weak commitments imposed on Parties in this regard, at the current stage 
it would be politically infeasible to incorporate any compliance mechanism from the perspective 
of TK preservation into the CBD framework. Nevertheless, despite lacking real teeth, the CBD 
COP/Working Group on Article 8(j) can regularly keep Parties informed of the significance of 
TK protection by signaling international concern at all levels of the CBD forums.    
¶52 On the other hand, relatively visible progress has been made concerning the ABS 
mechanism that has covered bio-related TK, evidenced in the Bonn Guidelines and the newly 
adopted Nagoya Protocol on ABS. As indicated above, the soft law character of the Bonn 
Guidelines may weaken their effectiveness. Attempts to establish an ABS treaty regime do 
demonstrate the CBD’s resolve to enforce one of its objectives on a global basis. In terms of 
obliging Parties to protect TK in the context of ABS, the eventual establishment of the Nagoya 
Protocol may be a repetition of an episode on how a soft approach of the Bonn Guidelines can be 
transformed into a more consolidated form.106 The new treaty does expand the realm of ABS to 
include TK protection. As indicated above, however, the Parties’ commitment on international 
level remains uncertain due to the wide margin of national discretion. Thus, in spite of its legally 
binding form, it remains to be observed whether and to what extent the newly developed ABS 
treaty regime, in the form of the Nagoya Protocol, may make substantial contribution to TK 
enforcement after its inception.107   
                                                
105 Some scholars are not convinced that presently “the COP will provide the vehicle for further clarification of 
indigenous and local communities’ rights.” BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 628. 
106 For instance, the binding form of non-compliance procedure set in the Montreal Protocol is preceded by a non-
binding resolution. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 218.   
107 According to Art. 30 of the Nagoya Protocol, the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol would adopt procedures 
and mechanisms to promote compliance with the Protocol. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 99, art. 30. 
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¶53 Furthermore, irrespective of its non-intellectual property rights treaty nature, the CBD 
appears to call on other intellectual property rights-related international institutions, such as the 
WIPO and WTO, to pay due regard to the protection of biodiversity-related TK in terms of 
property rights.108 Particularly in light of this push for multilateral approaches to TK protection, 
the CBD has become pivotal in initiating and promoting TK protection amongst relevant 
international legal regimes.   
B. The World Intellectual Property Organization 
1. Background 
¶54 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations that supervises global intellectual property treaties, appears to be relatively attentive to 
the grave concern of the CBD regarding the impact of intellectual property rights on the 
implementation of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) system. At its sixth meeting, the COP to 
the CBD in 2002 adopted a decision on the “Role of intellectual property rights in the 
implementation of access and benefit-sharing arrangements.”109 With respect to the issue of TK 
protection, Parties are invited to encourage the disclosure of the origin of bio-related TK. The 
COP has signaled that TK-related intellectual property rights fall under the competence of other 
international institutions, such as the WIPO. It thus invited WIPO to prepare a technical study on 
disclosure requirements of associated TK and its sources, where they are utilized in the 
development of the claimed inventions.110 The WIPO was also encouraged Parties to consider 
means by which they could collaborate to protect TK.111 
¶55 In 2000, in response to the increasing global concern over the impact of intellectual 
property rights on the protection of genetic resources, TK, and traditional cultural expressions, 
WIPO established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC). Since then, especially with the CBD’s 
urging, the IGC has been conducting a substantial and comprehensive study on the legal and 
policy options for the protection of TK.112 The task involves “analyses of existing national and 
                                                
108 See notes 105-07 infra and accompanying text. CBD/COP Decision X/1, I: Adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, ¶ 6, 
at 3.  
109 Convention on Biological Diversity, The Hague, Apr. 7-19, 2002, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, Annex I, 
at 284, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-06- dec-en.pdf. 
110 Id. ¶ 4. 
111 Id. ¶ 10. 
112 The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Ninth Sess., Apr. 24-28, 2006, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, ¶ 1 (Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter IGC Ninth Sess. Doc.]. IGC reviewed then existing sui generis 
TK laws during its fifth session in July 2003. See WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/6 and 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/7. 
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regional legal mechanisms, certain core elements of TK protection, cases studies, ongoing 
surveys of international policy and law as well as certain previously supported key principles and 
objectives of TK protection.”113 
¶56 From an intellectual property perspective, the WIPO considers TK protection as 
comprising both defensive and proactive approaches.114 After an extensive review on legal and 
policy options, the IGC, at its eighth session in 2005, finalized a document, entitled “Draft 
Provisions for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Policy Objectives and Core 
Principles.”115 Instead of creating positive rights for TK holders, the instrument is confined to 
deterring the illicit uses and misappropriations of TK.116 The draft includes three parts: Policy 
Objectives, Guiding Principles and Substantive Provisions.     
2. The Implications of the Draft Objectives and Principles on TK Protection 
i) Overview 
¶57 The Policy Objectives underline “common general directions for [TK] protection and 
provide a consistent policy framework.”117 Despite its presumed status of a preamble118 that 
normally lacks definite legal configuration, this sector delivers significant messages on TK 
protection. The value of TK recognized in the task appears to be fairly extensive and holistic.119 
More importantly, the Policy Objectives indicate the goal of recognizing and promoting the 
status of TK holders, which makes the WIPO work one of the most attentive international 
instruments for the interest of TK holders. Furthermore, given that the ABS initialed by the CBD 
has been considered to be an effective tool against the illicit use of genetic resources and 
associated knowledge, the Policy Objectives are intended to incorporate the CBD mandates into 
its text, such as prior informed consent and benefit-sharing.120 To deter the erroneous grant of 
intellectual property rights over TK to unauthorized parties, the Objectives expect patent 
                                                
113 IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 1. 
114 World Intellectual Property Organization, Traditional Knowledge, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk (last visited Nov. 
3, 2011). 
115 See WIPO DRAFT, TK Objectives and Principles, supra note 2. 
116 IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 5; Reproduction of Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 “The Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles,” Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Twelfth Sess., Feb. 25-29, 2008, ¶ 18, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/12/5(c) (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter IGC Twelfth Sess. Doc.]; In the earlier sessions of IGC, 
discussion focused more on defensive protection with a view toward the prevention of illegal granting of intellectual 
property rights, which covered the proposal on disclosure of origin of TK. See DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra 
note 17, at 342. 
117 IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 4(i). 
118 IGC Eighth Sess. Doc., supra note 2, Annex, at 6. 
119 Id. at 3. 
120 Id. at 4. 
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applicants to disclose the country of origin of TK, as well as the evidence of compliance with 
prior informed consent and benefit-sharing arrangements required by the country of origin.121 
¶58 General Guiding Principles are designed to “ensure that the substantive provisions 
concerning protection are equitable, balanced, effective and consistent, and appropriately 
promote the objectives of protection.”122  
¶59 Several Guiding Principles do invoke a mandate to address the needs and rights of TK 
holders.123 Also, certain elements of ABS have been confirmed as part of the Principles.124 The 
inclusion of the ABS elements simply reflects the harmonization with the CBD mandate that 
confers national authority to regulate the matter in this regard.125 In particular, the Principles 
declare that the rights of TK holders should be recognized and respected. While the CBD has not 
yet endorsed the “rights” of TK holders, the WIPO’s design represents remarkable progress in 
this direction. Nevertheless, according to the commentary on the Principles, such rights would 
not be on a comprehensive basis. Rather, the rights seem to be narrowed to a defensive nature, 
which are applied only to the protection against misappropriation.126 The principle of recognizing 
the specific characteristics of TK (traditional, collective or communal, inter-generational and 
constantly evolving) is specified.127 The capacity building for TK holders is of grave concern to 
the WIPO task.128 
ii) Legal Framework 
¶60 Arguably the most important contribution of the draft to TK protection is the formation of a 
set of substantive provisions that are largely legal in nature. The draft provisions consist of 
fourteen articles that constitute a systematic legal framework for the protection of TK. 
¶61 As mentioned, it is not the intention of the IGC to adopt a positive-rights approach toward 
TK protection. Thus, no exclusive or monopolistic property rights are created for TK.129 Article 1 
explicitly declares that the protection is limited to rights against misappropriation or misuse. 
Respecting existing national legal systems concerning TK protection, Article 2 gives nations 
much discretion and flexibility regarding the legal form of protection.130 
                                                
121 Id. at 4-5. 
122 Id. at 8. 
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 10-11. 
126 Id. at 9. See also the discussion of Peruvian legislation, infra note 147 and accompanying text, for an example of 
how prior informed consent and benefit sharing should be implemented to prevent misappropriation.  
127 Id. at 11. 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 14. 
130 Id. at 17. 
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¶62 Articles 3 to 5 tend to clarify the realm of both TK and its holders. Given the diverse 
definitions and scope of TK in national legal systems, Article 3, titled “General Scope of Subject 
Matter,” “does not seek to apply one singular and exhaustive definition” of TK.131 Rather, it 
simply underlines a general description and then an illustrative list of elements within the scope 
of TK.132 “Eligibility for the protection,” specified in Article 4, manages to propose what 
qualities TK should have, mainly: (i) a traditional, intergenerational character; (ii) a distinctive 
association with its traditional holders; and (iii) a sense of linkage with the identity of the TK 
holding community.133 Article 5 defines which TK holders are entitled to such protection. The 
beneficiaries comprise the indigenous and traditional communities that generate, preserve and 
transmit the knowledge, or individuals within these communities and peoples.134 
¶63 Articles 6 and 7 incorporate the mandate of ABS that has been adopted and implemented 
within the CBD and many national regimes.135 Article 8 provides exceptions and limitations to 
the TK protection with a view to reconciling with public interests and policy.136 In contrast to 
general intellectual property rights setting the duration of protection, Article 9 considers TK 
protection should last as long as the TK meets the criteria of eligibility for protection defined in 
Article 4.137 Article 10 deals with transitional measures, which give fair treatment to third parties 
who acquired TK in good faith before the implementation of the protection measures.138 
According to Article 11, the formalities of protection are not required. Countries are allowed to 
maintain a system of TK registers. Yet, the system should not prejudice undisclosed TK or the 
interests of TK holders.139 Article 12, titled “Consistency with the General Legal Framework,” 
requires that access to bio-diversity related knowledge be consistent with national laws 
governing the matter.140  
¶64 Article 13 mainly provides the content of competency for each national authority in order 
to assist the administration and enforcement of such protection.141 The provision also mandates 
that enforcement mechanisms “should be fair and equitable, [and] should be accessible[,] 
[a]ppropriate and not burdensome for holders of traditional knowledge, and should provide 
safeguards for legitimate third party interest and the public interest.”142 
                                                
131 Id. at 20. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 22-23. 
134 Id. at 24. 
135 Id. at 27-32. 
136 Id. at 33-34. 
137 Id. at 35-36. 
138 Id. at 37-38. 
139 Id. at 39-40. 
140 Id. at 41-42. 
141 Id. at 44-45. 
142 Id. at 44. 
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¶65 In terms of the status of national TK holders in foreign countries, Article 14 on 
international and regional protection adopts the principle of national treatment. Consequently, 
foreign TK holders enjoy no fewer benefits than those who are nationals of the country offering 
protection.143 
3. An Assessment of the WIPO Task 
¶66 It may be fair to contend that the current WIPO/IGC draft is the most systematic 
international instrument for TK protection, at least in terms of IP protection. It not only provides 
lofty objectives and principles, but also a definite and well-structured legal foundation. If widely 
accepted and implemented, it would to a certain degree promote TK protection on a global basis 
and advance the rights and interests of TK holders as well. Not surprisingly, the WIPO has been 
considered to be the appropriate forum for formulating relevant rules on TK protection.144  
¶67 Although the IGC work has not yet been finalized, the influence of the draft over 
international legislative progress cannot be underestimated. Indeed, several regional and national 
processes have availed themselves of the draft WIPO provisions in developing and designing 
their TK protection measures.145 
¶68 In spite of the above accomplishment, it should be noted that the TK protection provided 
by the draft instrument is a defensive mechanism in that it only applies to action against 
misappropriation of TK.146 With respect to national practice, the Peruvian legislation represents 
the leading practice of allowing TK holders, inter alia, to enjoy the right of protection against 
unauthorized use, which echoes the WIPO’s approach.147 
¶69 Further, certain deficiencies embodied in the WIPO work are evident. These provisions, 
irrespective of WIPO’s well-organized structure, fall short of crystalline obligations upon States 
given that the WIPO avoids using the term “shall” as much as possible.148 As a result, no definite 
and strong commitments are established for States, and they still can maintain extensive 
discretion and latitude in regulating TK protection. More importantly, the final form and status of 
                                                
143 Id. at 47-49. 
144 Weerawit Weeraworawit, International Legal Protection for Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore: Challenges for the Intellectual Property System, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 157, 164-65 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds. 2003).    
145 IGC Twelfth Sess. Doc., supra note 116, ¶¶ 33-35 (pointing out how the CBD, Mongolia, the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organization and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have used part of the 
draft as a reference to develop their agendas). 
146 E.g. DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 349-51. 
147 Peruvian Law N° 27811, supra note 52, arts. 42, 43. It should be noted that the WIPO document would not 
prevent States from adopting a more positive approach for TK protection. Actually, positive protection had been 
discussed at the WIPO forum. See DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 338-39. 
148 The term ‘shall’ is rarely applied. Arts. 1 and 9(2) are the only two instances; the wording ‘should’ or ‘may’ is 
frequently used instead. 
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the document has not yet been settled.149 It is observed that most WIPO members, either 
developed or developing nations, now lack strong political will and momentum to take the task 
in a serious manner.150 Accordingly, there is a high possibility that the instrument may turn out to 
be similar to the voluntary Bonn Guidelines.  
¶70 Of course, the IGC will continue to seek international consensus on TK protection with a 
view to setting up a minimum standard. Even if the text may result in a binding instrument, the 
inherent flaw of the WIPO that weakens its effectiveness, is the lack of a decent enforcement 
mechanism.151   
C. The WTO/TRIPS 
¶71 The international protection of intellectual property rights should fall under the competence 
of the WIPO. However, unsatisfied with the poor enforcement mechanism of the WIPO, 
developed countries proposed an intellectual property rights agenda under the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations between 1986 and 1994. The final conclusion of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) within the WTO regime 
represents the triumph of developed countries, led by the United States (U.S.), which had long 
appealed for an effective and universal enforcement of intellectual property rights protection.152 
Since then, the WTO has acquired parallel competence over intellectual property rights 
protection, irrespective of the existence of the WIPO.       
¶72 The present TRIPS context does not cover TK protection.153 TK draws the attention of the 
WTO as a result of the CBD’s call for relevant international organizations, including the WTO, 
to be aware about the impact of intellectual property rights policy on access and benefit-sharing 
of genetic resources and associated knowledge.154 Developing countries have especially sensed 
the gravity of the piracy and misappropriation of bio-diversity related TK, mostly occurring in 
their territories.155 Since 1999, the TRIPS Council has accordingly begun to debate and review 
the interrelationship between the TRIPS and the CBD.156 
                                                
149 IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 14 (outlining five possible options of binding or non-binding 
arrangements. The latter covers declaration, recommendation, or guidelines).    
150 DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 343. 
151 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 409 (3d ed. 2005). 
152 Id. at 409-10. 
153 See DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 344; Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Intellectual Property Protection after 
TRIPS: An Asian Experience, in INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS IT FAIR? 71, 78 
(Justin Malbon & Charles Lawson eds. 2008). 
154 CBD, supra note 13, decision V/16, ¶ 14; V/26 B, ¶ 2 (inviting the WTO alike to deal with the relationship 
between TRIPS and CBD). 
155 UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 398 (2005). 
156 See generally Sabrina Shaw and Risa Schwartz, Trade and Environment in the WTO: State of Play, 36 J. WORLD 
TRADE 129, 138-39 (2002). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 108 
¶73 At its fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha in November 2001, the WTO adopted the 
Doha Development Agenda,157 in which the issue of TRIPS’ relation with the CBD (including 
TK) continued to be included in the WTO new round negotiations. Paragraph 19 of the Doha 
Development Agenda provides: 
We instruct the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme including 
under the review of Article 27.3(b), the review of the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work foreseen pursuant to 
paragraph 12 of this Declaration, to examine, inter alia, the relationship between 
the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection 
of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments 
raised by Members pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS 
Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 
of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the development 
dimension.158 
Initially there had been different views on whether the WTO is the right forum for TK 
negotiations. Developed countries had insisted that the WIPO/IGC is the more suitable forum. In 
contrast, developing countries support the protection of TK through negotiations at the WTO, 
partly due to the insufficient enforcement power of the WIPO.159 Currently, however, the WTO 
has made no progress on positive TK protection.160  
¶74 TK protection, however, has been negotiated under the context of the TRIPS-CBD 
relationship since 2002. The central deliberations in the TRIPS Council have focused on the 
proposals of many bio-resource-rich developing countries regarding the disclosure of origin, 
which has also been a focal debate at the CBD and WIPO.161 They appeal the revision of the 
TRIPS Agreement to add further disclosure obligations. The proposed amendment requires that 
patent applicants shall provide, as a condition to acquiring patent rights, the following evidence:  
                                                
157 The World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, The Fourth Ministerial 
Conference, Doha, Nov. 9-14, 2001, The Doha Development Agenda, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 
746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
158 Id. ¶ 19. 
159 See generally UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 155, at 399. 
160 Some are skeptical of the appropriateness of the WTO/TRIPS establishing new norms on positive TK protection. 
DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 345. See also Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual 
Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 149-59 (2005) (discussing whether these 
proposed norms are adequate to deal with communally-held TK).  
161 DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 342, 344. 
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! (i) disclosure of the source and country of origin of the biological resource 
and of the traditional knowledge used in the invention; 
! (ii) evidence of prior informed consent through approval of authorities 
under the relevant national regime; and 
! (iii) evidence of fair and equitable benefit-sharing under the relevant 
national regime.162 
Developing countries contend that the disclosure requirements, if made mandatory, would be 
useful to deter the undesirable grant of patents for inventions that misappropriate or illicitly 
acquire bio-resources or associated TK.163 Further, such revision aims to ensure that TRIPS is 
implemented in a manner supportive of the CBD objectives.164  
¶75 Nonetheless, the proposal has met the strong opposition of some developed members. For 
example, the U.S. consistently objects to the amendment. The U.S. argues that the requirement 
would create an unnecessary burden upon national patent authorities,165 and that the more 
effective means to curb bio-piracy is through solid enforcement of national ABS laws and 
contract arrangements.166 Switzerland, although sympathetic to the concern raised by developing 
countries, proposes the amendment of the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty as an alternative.167  
¶76 Since the release of the disclosure proposal, both groups have been engaging in a very 
heated debate.168 Given the significant controversy of the amendment and the persistent 
opposition by developed world, especially the U.S., there seems to be no sign that the stalemate 
will be solved in the near future or that the disclosure revision will reach consensus among WTO 
members.169 
                                                
162 Submission by Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela, The 
Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403, ¶ 1 (June 24, 2003) [hereinafter Developing Countries, 
IP/C/W/403] (emphasis in original), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm. 
163 Id. ¶ 8. 
164 Id. ¶ 3. 
165 Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/434, ¶ 15 (Nov. 26, 2004).  
166 Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/449, ¶¶ 19-21, 26, 39, 41 
(June 10, 2005). 
167 Communication from Switzerland, Review of Aricle 27.3(b), the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/400/Rev.1 (June 18, 2003). 
168 Developing countries are represented by Brazil and India. The U.S. continues to play the major role in opposition 
to the proposal. See generally Ni, supra note 15, at 449-52, 53. 
169 In order to reach a compromise, Ni suggests that such a disclosure requirement could be of a discretional instead 
of compulsory nature for WTO members. In effect, the discretion allows nations to decide whether patent applicants 
are required to submit necessary information in this regard. While many developing countries have linked the grant 
of patents to the compliance with their ABS laws, this approach ensures the consistency of such national laws with 
TRIPS. Ni, supra note 15, at 457-58.   
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¶77 If the developing countries’ proposal succeeds, the amendment would become obligatory 
upon each WTO member, and national relevant IP laws must be revised accordingly. The 
implementation of the mandate would be under the supervision of the TRIPS Council. The non-
compliance of the presumed obligations would be subject to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism that provides a relatively effective procedure.170 Were such an amendment to pass, 
TRIPS would mandate compulsory disclosure of TK origin and it would allow TK-hosting-
countries who are WTO members to sue countries like the U.S. (also a WTO member) if U.S. 
agents (such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) fail to require intellectual property rights 
applicants to disclose the information. This would be a dispute between WTO members instead 
of between indigenous groups and States. Of course, the local groups may pressure their hosting 
countries to resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
developing countries are convinced that the WTO is the appropriate forum to effectively solve 
the problem of the misappropriation of bioresources and related knowledge. 
D.  The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:171 The Protection of TK Holders 
from a Human Rights Perspective  
¶78 Most TK holders are from indigenous communities. As TK holders constitute the most 
important stakeholder in the context of TK protection, their TK rights should be fairly protected 
and recognized. 
¶79 The promotion and recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights have become important 
international issues. In addition to the efforts of the International Labor Organization (ILO),172 
the U.N., during the past several decades, has engaged in lawmaking to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples in many fora. For example, the discussion of issues pertaining to indigenous 
peoples was initiated by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities under the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the 
U.N. However, a serious deliberation of protecting indigenous peoples’ rights had not taken 
                                                
170 See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 
103-39 (2d ed. 2006). Disputes between WTO members are governed by “Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes,” of which Art. 23 is to be interpreted to grant the WTO exclusive jurisdiction 
over disputes among members. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 124 (2d ed. 1999). 
171 In addition to the U.N. lawmaking for the rights of indigenous peoples, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) had concluded two conventions for the protection of indigenous peoples: the 1957 Convention No. 107 and 
the 1989 Convention No. 169. However, these treaties have not been widely ratified by countries with indigenous 
populations. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 626. 
172 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (I.L.O. No. 169), June 27, 1989, 
28 I. L.M.S 1382 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169]. 
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place until the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a sub-organ under the 
Sub-Commission, in 1982.173 
¶80 The mandate of the Working Group aims to: (i) annually review recent developments 
pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous peoples, and (ii) develop international standards regarding the human rights of 
indigenous peoples.174 Following a resolution of the Sub-Commission stating that a special 
instrument, in the form of a declaration, was needed, the Working Group first formulated certain 
generally agreed-upon principles. Over time, it eventually completed the draft Universal 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1993.175  
¶81 In accordance with a resolution of the Commission on Human Rights,176 the draft had been 
further developed during eleven sessions between 1995 and 2006. The newly established Human 
Rights Council finally approved the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples on June 29, 2006177 and recommended it to the General Assembly for adoption. Given 
the opposition by countries with large indigenous peoples to the declaration,178 the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly in November of 2006 voted to defer further action on the 
declaration.179 Eventually, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on September 13, 
2007.180  
¶82 The U.N. instrument contains several provisions upholding the rights of indigenous peoples 
on TK. Article 11 recognizes the rights of the peoples to maintain, protect and develop the past, 
present, and future manifestations of their cultures.181 With respect to the remedy for 
misappropriation of their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property, States are 
                                                
173 See XANTHAKI , supra note 8, at 102-03. 
174 E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, 1st Regular Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1982/82, at 26-27 (May 7, 1982). 
175 E.S.C. Rep. of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Its Forty-
Sixth Sess., Aug. 1-26, 1994, at 103-04, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994). 
176 Commission on Human Rights Res. 1995/32, 51st Sess., E/CN.4/RES/1995/32 (Mar. 3, 1995). 
177 Human Rights Council Res. 2006/2 (June 29, 2006), Working group of the Commission on Human Rights to 
elaborate a draft declaration in accordance with paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution 49/214 of 23 
December 1994, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., A/HRC/RES/2006/2 (June 29, 2006), 
http://www.gcc.ca/pdf/INT000000021.pdf. Adopted by a recorded vote of 30 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions. See 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
178 The U.S. then joined Australia and New Zealand to strongly criticize the declaration. Contemporary Practice of 
the United States Relating to International Law, 101 AM J. INT’L L. 212 (2007).   
179 Press Release, Third Committee, Third Committee Approves Draft Resolution on Right to Development; Votes 
to Defer Action Concerning Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3878 (Nov. 28, 2006), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gashc3878.doc.htm (last visisted May 10, 2007). 
180 See U.N. Declaration, supra note 16. 
181 Id. art. 11(1). 
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required to provide an effective mechanism.182 This mandate coincides with the WIPO’s TK 
instrument, which focuses on legal protection against misappropriation.183 
¶83 More importantly, Article 31 explicitly recognizes their right to TK in the context of 
cultural development, including intellectual property rights to TK: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, . . . 
They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual 
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional 
cultural expressions.184 
Furthermore, the declaration demands that States, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take 
effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of the rights listed in the declaration.185 
In contrast to previous international instruments concerning the duty of States regarding TK 
protection, this provision seems to send a relatively strong message to States hosting indigenous 
peoples. 
¶84 This instrument also declares certain rights that are relevant to the preservation of TK as a 
whole. Article 25 recognizes the distinct relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
traditionally owned or occupied lands, territories, and resources.186 Additionally, their right to 
own, use, develop, and control these areas has been affirmed.187 Article 29 bestows upon 
indigenous peoples the right to conserve and protect the environment.188 As mentioned above, 
these rights to some extent have been incorporated into the current CBD lawmaking process in 
Article 8(j).189 
¶85 The declaration, irrespective of its adoption and possible influence, is not legally binding. 
But, multilateral declarations are able to generate a variety of lawmaking effects, which can be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.190 It has been observed that the degree of support for a 
declaration matters.191 In effect, a consensus declaration or a unanimous adoption amounts to a 
sign of strong expectations of compliance.192 By contrast, “[d]issenting minorities may 
                                                
182 Id. art. 11(2). 
183 See WIPO DRAFT, TK Objectives and Principles, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2, 7, 13. 
184 U.N. Declaration, supra note 16, art. 31(1) (emphasis added). 
185 Id. art. 31(2). 
186 Id. art. 25. 
187 Id. art. 26. 
188 Id. art. 29. 
189 U.N. Environment Programme, supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. 
190 They may constitute evidence of existing law, or of the opinion juris necessary for new law, or of the practice of 
states. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 31. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 32. 
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undermine the authority and lawmaking significance of a resolution, particularly if they comprise 
states most affected.”193 Indeed, the U.N. declaration was not approved by consensus or by 
unanimous vote. The four negative votes on the Declaration thus may presumably have a 
significant diminishing effect. Nonetheless, indicating that those objecting States actually 
accepted core principles and values of the Declaration during the debates and negotiations, 
Wiessner argues that “the four states in opposition to the Declaration have demonstrated an 
opinio juris—a willingness to be bound if all of the provisions were formulated to agree with 
their detailed policy preference.”194     
¶86 The instrument has actually become so dynamic and influential as to shape States’ behavior 
and policy.195 It can be expected that the U.N. articulation may create further impetus for States 
to protect the rights of indigenous peoples regarding TK. 
¶87 It is worth noting that the Declaration tends to strengthen its implementation and 
effectiveness by requesting the U.N. system, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (UNPFII),196 and States to promote respect for and full application of the content of the 
Declaration.197 Literally speaking, the UNPFII would be competent to monitor and supervise the 
progress and compliance of the Declaration.198 It remains to be seen how far and to what extent 
each nation would implement the U.N. mandate, and how seriously the U.N. regime may ensure 
the effectiveness and observance of the rules.  
IV. DO WE NEED A SINGLE FORUM TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE? 
¶88 The above study indicates the active and diverse global lawmaking on TK. The 
development of course will continue to evolve and progress. The proliferation of international 
TK lawmaking reflects the broad spectrum of TK, including, inter alia, the concern of nature 
                                                
193 Id. 
194 Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1165 and n.153 (2008). 
195 It is shown that the adoption of the Declaration has influenced many countries’ statutes or policies on indigenous 
affairs, such as those of the Philippines and some Latin American countries. Id. at 1162. The U.S., Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia recently have shifted their original positions so as to support the U.N. Declaration. Moreover, 
Bolivia has passed a law (No. 3760) to incorporate the declaration. See INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, http://www.iwgia.org/sw37643.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
196 The U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) serves an advisory role to the U.N. Economic and 
Social Council, providing advice and reports concerning indigenous affairs while the Council is in session. About 
Us/Mandate, UN PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); Background Information, U.N. 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/ecosoc/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
197 U.N. Declaration, supra note 16, art. 42. 
198 For a discussion of the role of the UNPFII in serving as a monitoring mechanism, see Viniyanka Prasad, The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Approach to Addressing the Unique Needs of 
Varying Populations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 297, 314-15 (2008). 
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conservation, cultural expression, intellectual property and the protection and recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. Usually a multilateral lawmaking process on the same subject matter 
may generate incoherent or even conflicting normative implications. Drahos points out that 
multiple international efforts to protect TK and the application of a variety of norms to TK 
protections that are already being enacted at state level would make TK regulations lose 
coherence and produce a clash of cultures, legal approaches, and enforcement strategies.199 In 
order to avoid such circumstances, the international community should promote harmony and 
coherence amongst the regimes at stake. 
¶89 The CBD appears to be the most dynamic global institution on the protection of TK. The 
CBD currently focuses on building an ABS international regime that would cover the 
enforcement of genetic resource-associated TK. The newly adopted Nagoya Protocol reflects the 
determination of the CBD Parties to eliminate bio-piracy and misappropriation of such genetic 
resources and associated knowledge. Overall, the lawmaking has been an international 
movement to consolidate and enhance the efforts in combating the illegal monopoly of such 
items, and to ensure that genetic resources and TK holders may benefit from the 
commercialization of these valuable objects. In spite of the promising effort, the CBD 
arrangement has its own limitations. The CBD, by its mandate, cannot govern the protection of 
TK beyond the bio-diversity related sphere and accordingly lacks expertise and competence to 
effectively address TK-related intellectual property rights. Without the cooperation of the U.S. 
(which has long been blamed for bio-related piracy) especially, the future international regime on 
ABS hardly can thoroughly redress the violation of provider parties’ national law concerning the 
preservation of bio-related TK. Because the U.S. is not a party to the CBD, the treaty body 
would be incapable of monitoring the U.S. patent policy concerning TK.  
¶90 The property and commercial orientation of the WIPO and WTO probably make them 
insufficient instruments in terms of governing TK protection. Also, it remains uncertain whether 
the U.N. Indigenous Forum can effectively supervise and enforce its TK mandate. 
¶91 Indeed, TK is not the only cross-cutting issue facing the international community. For 
instance, as noted by Boyle and Chinkin, there have been a variety of U.N. bodies governing the 
development of forest-related rules,200 and “no single forum is self-evidently the right one to 
undertake the development of new laws.”201 Given the limitation embodied in the present TK 
lawmaking regimes, similar to the forest scenario, no single forum currently proves to be 
available and competent to manage TK thoroughly.  
                                                
199 Drahos, supra note 3, at 414. 
200 BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 117 (including FAO, International Tropical Timber Organization, The 
World Heritage Convention adopted UNESCO, Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP, and Convention on 
Climate Change, etc). 
201 Id. 
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¶92 Ideally, the international community needs a coherent and integrated instrument or 
institution on TK to formulate binding rules and effective enforcement mechanisms. The diverse 
merits of TK make it difficult to decide which single international institution or treaty body, and 
in what form, should govern the matter. Drahos proposes the establishment of a Global Bio-
Collecting Society (GBS) regime to co-ordinate multiple international institutions, and argues the 
agenda of enforcement should be placed as the first priority.202 Yet, the question remains 
unsettled as to which international institution should be in charge of the matter. 
¶93 Constructing a single institution on TK lawmaking would likely not be realistic in the near 
future. Nevertheless, in light of the lawmaking process of those institutions mentioned above, it 
is worth noting that, the U.N.-related institutions (CBD, WIPO, and U.N. Human Rights’ 
mechanisms) to some extent have already been engaging in harmonization of lawmaking 
activities. Not only do they have cross-culture dialogue203 and cooperation,204 but they are also 
seeking mutual incorporation and integration in the TK context (see Figure 1 below for a graphic 
representation of this concept). The constant sharing of common values could alleviate the 
adverse effect of fragmentation of international TK lawmaking and help promote coherence 
among these regimes. Certainly, trans-institutional cooperation and mutual supportiveness for 
TK protection among the relevant international TK instruments will be essential as the respective 
TK instruments become operative and mature in the future.    
¶94 Figure 1: The Mutual Integration of Components among TK Regimes 
 
                                                
202 Drahos, supra note 3, at 412-15. 
203 OGUAMANAM, supra note 1, at 191-222 (observing the cross-cultural dialogue between the CBD and WIPO). 
204 See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 628, n.214 (noting the close cooperation between the CBD and the UNPFII). 
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¶95 The protection of TK is no longer a matter of national context. Rather, there has been a 
growing international movement to structure TK in a more normative form. Of course, the 
lawmaking process of relevant international legal regimes is still ongoing. Presently, it remains 
premature to predict the eventual outcome. Given the largely soft law character of most 
international instruments on TK, it seems far from clear whether States may seriously conform to 
the rules. The effect of those “laws” may be even less prominent, especially when a powerful 
mechanism to supervise or monitor the national enforcement of TK mandates is still scant. Yet, 
the adoption of a binding ABS by the CBD may make things different. 
¶96 The uncertain international legal status of those TK holders, mainly indigenous peoples, 
would leave the protection of TK to the discretion of each State. Indeed, the ABS Protocol of the 
CBD, if run successfully, would uphold the protection of biodiversity-related TK and preserve 
the interest of indigenous and local groups holding such TK. Its effectiveness is nevertheless 
confined to matters of ABS regarding associated TK. 
¶97 The significance of the WIPO document on TK protection cannot be overemphasized. The 
work can be deemed as international consensus to protect TK from the perspective of a defensive 
approach. However, as indicated, it would not be possible to make the document legally binding, 
partly because the expressions used in the draft have indicated that it may turn out to be a form 
of voluntary guidelines.   
¶98 The WTO agreements, including the TRIPS, are the most mandatory of the current 
international regimes. Their enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms are also relatively 
effective. The current Doha Round Negotiations, however, do not create a particular agenda for 
TK protection. There has also been strong resistance against the approach to add the CBD 
elements into the disclosure requirement for patent applications. It is thus highly unlikely that the 
WTO may actively contribute to the protection of TK at the present stage. 
¶99 Most of current TK lawmaking remains in a preliminary stage and the proposed documents 
are largely of soft law character. However, their draft form and non-binding nature, such as the 
WIPO and U.N. instruments, do not prevent them from providing useful reference for national 
TK legislation. It is also predictable that the elaboration and finalization of these TK instruments 
may help promote and enhance the awareness and political will to engage in domestic TK law- 
and policy-making. It may thus be premature to cast a definite judgment on the achievement of 
the current international lawmaking on TK. Whether the movement would be a useful vehicle or 
just an empty box awaits further assessment. 
¶100 On the other hand, the proliferation of global TK lawmaking reveals a potential 
contradiction amongst relevant international norms. To enhance mutual supportiveness and to 
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avoid conflict, it is highly desirable to articulate a mechanism to harmonize and reconcile those 
lawmaking vehicles. While the formation of a single comprehensive international institution for 
the development of TK law probably remains remote or unrealistic, the present and continuous 
harmonization among TK lawmaking mechanisms proves to be essential and must be 
strengthened. 
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Annex I: The Current Status of International Legal Instruments on the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge 
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